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Abstract. Deduction modulo consists in applying the inference rules of
a deductive system modulo a rewrite system over terms and formulæ.
This is equivalent to proving within a so-called compatible theory. Con-
versely, given a first-order theory, one may want to internalize it into a
rewrite system that can be used in deduction modulo, in order to get
an analytic deductive system for that theory. In a recent paper, we have
shown how this can be done in classical logic. In intuitionistic logic, how-
ever, we show here not only that this may be impossible, but also that
the set of theories that can be transformed into a rewrite system with an
analytic sequent calculus modulo is not co-recursively enumerable. We
nonetheless propose a procedure to transform a large class of theories
into compatible rewrite systems. We then extend this class by working
in conservative extensions, in particular using Skolemization.
1 Introduction
Mathematical propositions are seldom proved in pure first-order logic, but more
often within a particular theory, e.g. arithmetic or Euclidean geometry. In gen-
eral, this is performed using an axiomatization of these theories, but this has
drawbacks. First, this is rather inefficient from an automated-proof-search point
of view, in particular when computations are involved. To be convinced of this,
one may try to prove a simple result such as “2+2=4” in Peano’s arithmetic. Sec-
ond, some interesting properties of deductive systems may be lost when proving
using axioms. In particular, in a constructive setting, the disjunction property,
that says that from a proof of P ∨Q one can find a proof of P or a proof of Q,
and the witness property, that says that from a proof of ∃x. P (x) one can find
a witness term t and a proof of P (t), no longer hold when using axioms.
Dowek, Hardin and Kirchner [11] proposed an alternative way of proving
within a theory: in deduction modulo, the inference rules used to prove a for-
mula are applied modulo a rewrite system. This system can rewrite terms, but
also atomic formulæ to formulæ. For instance, given the (propositional) rule
x× y = 0→ x = 0∨ y = 0, we can build the following proof of ∀x. x× x = 0⇒
x = 0 in the sequent calculus modulo:
Ax.
x = 0 − x = 0
Ax.
x = 0 − x = 0
∨− x× x = 0−→ x = 0 ∨ x = 0
x× x = 0 − x = 0
−⇒
− x× x = 0⇒ x = 0
−∀
− ∀x. x× x = 0⇒ x = 0
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We can see that proving in the sequent calculus modulo this rule is equivalent
to proving in the theory ∀x y. x× y = 0 ⇔ x = 0 ∨ y = 0. Propositions 1.6
and 1.8 of [11] tell us that given a rewrite system, it is always possible to find
a theory such that proving modulo the rewrite system is equivalent to proving
in the theory. Presentations of that theory are then called compatible with the
rewrite system.
We are interested here in the converse problem: given a theory, how is it
possible to internalize it into a rewrite system usable in deduction modulo? In
which case, we will also say that the rewrite system is compatible with the
theory. Proof search methods based on deduction modulo, e.g. ENAR [11] and
TaMed [5] can then be used to find proofs in those theories. These methods
are complete only if the sequent calculus modulo the compatible rewrite system
admits cut. Indeed, it may not be the case in deduction modulo, as shown by
the consistent example A→ A⇒ B: B possesses the following proof
Ax. *
A⇒ B − B, A
Ax.
B − B
⇒− *
A − B
?
A − B
−⇒ *
− B, A
Cut
− B
where the inference rules applied modulo A → A ⇒ B are marked by ∗. But
B cannot be proved without cut. We therefore want to find compatible rewrite
systems ensuring the cut admissibility. This was for instance successfully done
by hand for arithmetic [13] and Zermelo’s set theory [12]. However, to be sure
that the deductive system modulo admits cuts, some tricks are used that seems
difficult to automate. This paper studies the automation of the transformation
of the presentation of an intuitionistic first-order theory into a rewrite system
that is applied modulo.
In a submitted paper [7], we proposed a complete solution in the case of clas-
sical logic: First, we have shown how to transform any presentation of a theory
into a compatible rewrite system; Then, we have defined a completion procedure
that transforms the resulting rewrite system to ensure that the sequent calculus
modulo the final rewrite system admits cut. In intuitionistic logic, however, there
are theories that cannot be transformed into a compatible rewrite system, as we
will soon show, and we cannot separate the production of the rewrite system
and its completion that ensures the cut admissibility.
To better explain how we will proceed in the intuitionistic case, let us recall
how theories can be internalized in classical logic. The main technical complica-
tion arises because in deduction modulo, left hand sides of proposition rewrite
rules must be atomic formulæ. To transform an axiom into such a rule, the idea
is therefore to apply the inference rules of a sequent calculus to decompose the
axiom and pick out one of its atomic subformula. To remain in the same theory,
the inference rules that we are using must preserve the provability. Therefore, we
are only allowed to apply invertible rules —recall that an inference rule is called
invertible if whenever its conclusion is derivable, its premises also are. Fortu-
nately, there exists sequent calculi for classical logic where all inference rules are
invertible, e.g. the system G4 of Kleene [19], so that the transformation is always
Automating Theories in Intuitionistic Logic 3
possible in classical logic. For instance, the theory presented by ∀x. ∃y. A(x, y) is
decomposed into the sequent− A(x, y), ∃y. A(x, y) which is in turn oriented into
the rewrite rule A(x, y)→ A(x, y)∨¬∃y. A(x, y). The transformation of sequents
into rewrite rules relies on classical tautologies, so that in intuitionistic logic, we
cannot hope to obtain such a result. Indeed, if you consider the theory presented
by the simple axiom A∨B with A and B some distinct atomic formulæ, you can
prove neither A nor B. However, were it possible to find a rewrite system for
that theory such that the sequent calculus modulo this system admits cuts, this
deductive system would have the disjunction property (see Proposition 3). As by
compatibility A∨B could be proven, either A or B should be provable, hence the
contradiction. Note that in classical logic, the axiom A ∨ B would produce the
rule A→ A ∨ ¬B, but it is not intuitionistically equivalent to A ∨B. We would
like to be able to characterize the presentations that have a compatible rewrite
system such that the sequent calculus modulo this system admits cuts, but we
prove that the set of such presentations is not co-recursively enumerable, that
is, cannot be decided. Nevertheless, we propose a procedure that transforms a
large class of theories into compatible rewrite systems. This procedure is a non-
trivial generalization of the procedure for classical logic, because we have to mix
the transformation into rewrite rules and the completion that ensures the cut
admissibility, and because we must develop new techniques to avoid being stuck
with examples such as A ∨ (B ⇒ A).
The same kind of counterexample as A ∨ B can be obtained from a theory
presented by an axiom of the form ∃x. A(x), using the witness property. In
that case however, it is possible to use Skolemization to work in a conservative
extension of the theory that has a compatible rewrite system such that the
sequent calculus modulo this rewrite system admits cuts. As Skolemization does
not always lead to a conservative extension in intuitionistic logic, this means
that this will not always be possible. In this paper, we investigate in which cases
it is possible to transform the presentation of a theory into a compatible rewrite
system, possibly using conservative extensions of the theory.
In the following section we recall some sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic
maximizing the number of invertible rules, and we introduce deduction modulo.
In Section 3 we prove that the set of presentations that have a compatible rewrite
system such that the sequent calculus modulo this system admits cut is not co-
recursively enumerable. Section 4 presents a procedure that tries to transform
a presentation into a compatible rewrite system. Then in Section 5, we extend
the domain where this procedure succeeds by considering infinite presentations,
equality and Skolemization. Finally, Section 6 provides an example application
extracted from the Intuitionistic Logic Theorem Proving library [24].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Sequent Calculi for Intuitionistic Logic
We use standard definitions for terms, predicates, propositions (with connectors
⊥,⊤,⇒,∧,∨ and quantifiers ∀, ∃), substitutions, term rewrite rules and term
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rewriting, as can be found in [1, 14]. The set of terms built from a signature Σ
and a set of variables V is denoted by T (Σ, V ), the replacement of a variable
x by a term t in a proposition P by {t/x}P , the application of a substitution
σ in a proposition P by σP , the free variables occurring in P by FV (P ). ¬P
is a shorthand for P ⇒ ⊥, and when Γ = P1, . . . , Pn, then
∧
Γ ,
∨
Γ and ¬Γ
are notations for P1 ∧ · · · ∧Pn, P1 ∨ · · · ∨ Pn and ¬P1, . . . ,¬Pn. P ⇔ Q denotes
(P ⇒ Q) ∧ (Q⇒ P ).
The reader is referred to [14] for an introduction to sequent calculi. A sequent
is a pair (Γ, ∆) of multisets of formulæ, denoted by Γ − ∆. A logical rule of
a sequent calculus decomposes a formula, which is called principal, appearing
in a sequent, into its direct subformulæ, which are called the side formulæ. For
instance, in
Γ − X, ∆ Γ, Y − ∆
⇒−
Γ, X ⇒ Y − ∆
X ⇒ Y is the principal formula, X and Y are the side formulæ, and the other
formulæ, those appearing in Γ and ∆, are called the extra formulæ. An inference
rule
H1 . . . Hn
C
is said invertible if whenever C can be proved, then
so can all Hi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A logical rule r permutes over a logical rule r’ if
whenever there is a proof ending with
H1 . . . Hn
r
C I1 . . . Im
r’
D
where the principal formula of r is not a side formula of r’, it is possible to build
a proof with r below r’. If an inference rule permutes with all the other rules,
it can be proved that it is invertible. A double horizontal line indicates several
application of an inference rule. We will also consider derivations, that is, partial
proofs where leafs are not all closed by Ax. The sequents appearing in the open
leafs of a derivation are called its premises.
The usual sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic, LJ, was introduced by
Gentzen [15]. It consists in allowing at most one formula to the right of the
sequents of the sequent calculus for classical logic LK. However, this has draw-
backs, because many rules cannot be permuted contrarily to classical logic, so
that almost all rules are not invertible. Therefore, it has been proposed to keep
multiple conclusions in the sequents, but to restrict only the rules where it is
needed, i.e. for the right rules for⇒ and ∀. The resulting system is called L’J [21],
LB [26] or LJm [23], with little differences between versions. We represent the
system LB in Fig. 1, as it appears in [26]. It is shown [26] that the only cases of
rules that do not permute are ∀− over −∀; ∀− and −∃ over ∃−; and ⇒− over −⇒
and −∀. This means that the only logical rules that are not invertible are ∀−, −∃
and ⇒−.
To make these rules invertible, one solution is to apply a contraction (∵− or
−∵) to the active formula just before applying the logical rule. This is what is
done in classical logic to obtain the system G4 [19] from LK. It can be shown [23]
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Identity rules
Ax.
Γ, X − X, ∆
Γ, X − ∆ Γ − X, ∆
Cut
Γ − ∆
Structural rules
Γ, X, X − ∆
∵ −
Γ, X − ∆
Γ − X, X, ∆
−∵
Γ − X, ∆
Γ − ∆
.−
Γ, X − ∆
Γ − ∆
−.
Γ − X, ∆
Logical rules
Γ − X, ∆ Γ, Y − ∆
⇒−
Γ, X ⇒ Y − ∆
Γ, X − Y
−⇒
Γ − X ⇒ Y
Γ, X, Y − ∆
∧−
Γ, X ∧ Y − ∆
Γ − X, ∆ Γ − Y,∆
−∧
Γ − X ∧ Y, ∆
Γ, X − ∆ Γ, Y − ∆
∨−
Γ, X ∨ Y − ∆
Γ − X, Y, ∆
−∨1
Γ − X ∨ Y, ∆
Γ, X(t) − ∆
∀−
Γ,∀x, X(x) − ∆
Γ − X(y)
−∀
y not free in
Γ, X(x), ∆Γ − ∀x, X(x)
Γ, X(y) − ∆
∃−
y not free in
Γ, X(x), ∆Γ, ∃x,X(x) − ∆
Γ − X(t), ∆
−∃
Γ − ∃x,X(x), ∆
⊥−
⊥ − C
−⊤
− ⊤
Fig. 1. Inference rules of LB [26]
Γ, X ⇒ Y − X, ∆ Γ, Y − ∆
⇒−
Γ, X ⇒ Y − ∆
Γ, X − Y
−⇒
Γ − X ⇒ Y, ∆
Γ, X(t),∀x, X(x) − ∆
∀−
Γ,∀x, X(x) − ∆
Γ − X(y)
−∀
y not free in
Γ, X(x), ∆Γ − ∀x, X(x), ∆
Γ, X(y) − ∆
∃−
y not free in
Γ, X(x), ∆Γ,∃x,X(x) − ∆
Γ − X(t),∃x, X(x),∆
−∃
Γ − ∃x,X(x), ∆
⊥−
Γ,⊥ − ∆
Γ − ∆
−⊥
Γ − ⊥, ∆
Γ − ∆
⊤−
Γ,⊤ − ∆
−⊤
Γ − ⊤, ∆
Fig. 2. Logical rules of LBi
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that for ⇒− it is only necessary to apply a contraction in the left premise. We
also want to get rid of the weakening rules (.− and −.), that are of course non
invertible. To do so, we have to allow extra formulæ in ⊥− and −⊤, to add a left
rule for ⊤ and a right rule for ⊥, and to allow weakening below an application of
−⇒ and −∀ and into premises of derivations. In so doing, it can be proved that all
structural rules are admissible (see Appendix A). The system that we use here
will be called LBi (“i” standing for invertible and not intuitionistic). Its logical
rules are presented in Fig. 2, except the rules for ∧ and ∨ that are the same than
in LB. Note that LBi has no structural rules. However, LBi is equivalent to LB
(see the proof in Appendix A).
Proposition 1. All inference rules of LBi but −⇒ and −∀ are invertible. None-
theless, when there is no extra formula on the right hand side of their conclusion,
−⇒ and −∀ are also invertible.
2.2 Deduction Modulo
An introduction on term rewriting can be found in [1]. We consider two kinds of
rules: the usual term rewrite rules, and proposition rewrite rules defined below.
An atomic formula A(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) can be rewritten to the atomic formula
A(s1, . . . , ti, . . . , sn) by a term rewrite rule l → r if si can be rewritten to ti by
l → r. This rewrite relation is extended to non-atomic formulæ by congruence.
A proposition rewrite rule is the pair of an atomic proposition A and a
proposition P , such that all free variables of P appear in A. It is denoted A→ P .
A proposition rewrite system is a set of proposition rewrite rules. A formula P
can be rewritten to a formula Q by the rule A → O at the position p with
substitution σ if the subterm of P at position p equals σA and Q is P where its
subterm at position p is replaced by σO.
In the following, a rewrite system R will be the disjoint union of a term
rewrite system and a proposition rewrite system. P −→
R
Q denotes the fact that
P can be rewritten to Q by some term or proposition rewrite rule in R, and
∗
−→
R
(resp.
∗
←→
R
) denotes the reflexive and transitive (resp. reflexive, symmetric
and transitive) closure of −→
R
.
As said above, deduction modulo consists in applying the inference rules of a
deductive system modulo a rewrite system. For instance, in LBi modulo R, the
left rule for ⇒ becomes
Γ, Z − X, ∆ Γ, Y − ∆
⇒− Z
∗
←→
R
X ⇒ Y
Γ, Z − ∆
Proving modulo a rewrite system R is equivalent to proving inside some theory
whose presentations are called compatible with R:
Definition 2. A presentation is a set of formulæ with no free variables. The
theory presented by a presentation Γ is the set of formulæ P such that Γ ′ − P
can be proved in the sequent calculus for some finite subset Γ ′ of Γ .
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Given a rewrite system R, its associated theory is the set of formulæ P such
that − P can be proved in the sequent calculus modulo R.
A presentation and a rewrite system R are said to be compatible if they are
associated with the same theory.
Note that these definitions depend on the considered logic (e.g. classical or in-
tuitionistic). Propositions 1.6 and 1.8 of [11] prove that a rewrite system always
has a compatible presentation. This shows that the theory associated with a
rewrite system is a theory in the standard meaning, that is, a deductively closed
set of formulæ.
Some automated theorem-proving procedures have been designed based on
deduction modulo, e.g. ENAR [11], generalizing resolution, as well as Tamed [5],
a tableau method. These methods are complete only if the sequent calculus
modulo admits cut. In fact, as proved by Hermant [17], the proofs found by
these methods are exactly the cut-free proofs of the asymmetric sequent calculus
modulo [9], a variant of the sequent calculus modulo where rewriting can only
be applied from bottom to top in the proofs. For instance the left rule for ⇒
becomes
Γ, X ⇒ Y − X, ∆ Γ, Y − ∆
⇒− Z
∗
−→
R
X ⇒ Y
Γ, Z − ∆
It can also be useful to distinguish which rules can be applied to the left and
to the right of a sequent, or more precisely at positive and negative position in
a sequent. Recall that a position in a formula is positive (resp. negative) if it is
in the left subformula of an even (resp. odd) number of ⇒. Suppose that the
rewrite rules are associated with polarities. We denote by A →+ P the rewrite
rule A→ P associated with a positive polarity, and dually for −. A proposition
P can be positively rewritten to Q inR
(
P −→
R +
Q
)
if P can be rewritten to Q by
a positive rule at a positive position or by a negative rule at a negative position.
A proposition P can be negatively rewritten to Q in R
(
P −→
R −
Q
)
if P can be
rewritten to Q by a negative rule at a positive position or by a positive rule at a
negative position. In the polarized sequent calculus modulo [8], formulæ in the
left (resp. right) of a sequent can only be negatively (resp. positively) rewritten,
so that the Ax. rule, for instance, becomes
Ax.
X −→
R −
←−
R +
Y
Γ, X − Y, ∆
In [7] we proved that for classical logic, the polarized sequent calculus is equiv-
alent to the asymmetric sequent calculus, also w.r.t. the cut admissibility. This
also holds for LBi (see Appendix B). The latter is equivalent to the original
version of the sequent calculus modulo, but if we are also concerned with cut
admissibility, they are equivalent if and only if the rewrite system is confluent.
Given a sequent Γ − ∆, we denote by Γ ⊢SR ∆ the fact that for finite subsets Γ
′
and ∆′ of Γ and ∆, the sequent Γ ′ − ∆′ can be derived from premises in the set
of sequents S, in the polarized LBi modulo R. If S and R are empty, we write
8 Guillaume Burel
Γ ⊢ ∆, which therefore means that there is a proof of Γ ′ − ∆′ in LBi without
modulo.
A (polarized) rewrite system R is called analytic if the polarized sequent
calculus modulo R admits cut, that is, if Γ ⊢R ∆ then Γ − ∆ can be proved in
the polarized LBi modulo R without Cut. In other words, adding Cut does not
increase the set of theorems.
Proposition 3 (Disjunction and witness property). Consider an analytic
rewrite system R.
– If ⊢R P ∨Q then either ⊢R P or ⊢R Q.
– If ⊢R ∃x. P then for some t ∈ T (Σ, V ), we have ⊢R {t/x}P .
Proof. If ⊢R P ∨Q, because R is analytic there is a cut-free proof of − P ∨Q in
the polarized LBi modulo R, and therefore also in the polarized LJ modulo R
(see Appendix B). As the left hand side of proposition rewrite rules are atomic
formulæ, if P ∨Q
∗
−→
R +
O then the connector at the root of O has to be ∨, so that
the only rule that can be applied is −∨, hence the conclusion. The proof of the
witness property is similar. ⊓⊔
3 Undecidability of the Automation
As we saw in the introduction, the theory A∨B with A and B atomic cannot be
transformed into an analytic compatible rewrite system. Therefore, we may want
to characterize the theories that have an analytic compatible rewrite system, and
to find an algorithm to build such rewrite systems. We prove in this section that
it cannot be done through a decidable characterization, because the set of such
theories is no co-recursively enumerable. In other words, if we have a procedure
that transforms a presentation into an analytic compatible rewrite system, it
would either be incomplete, that is, the procedure would not answer for some
theories that do have an analytic compatible rewrite system, or it would not
always terminate.
Theorem 4. The set of presentations that can be transformed into an analytic
compatible rewrite system is not co-recursively enumerable.
Proof. Recall that the set of valid formulæ in classical first-order logic is not
co-recursively enumerable. Using the double-negation translation, neither is the
set of valid formulæ in intuitionistic first-order logic. We prove that a formula P
is intuitionistically valid iff the presentation {(A⇒ P )∨A} can be transformed
into an analytic compatible rewrite system.
Let P be a formula and A an atomic formula not appearing in P . We do not
have (A⇒ P )∨A ⊢ A: it does not hold in classical logic, so neither does it hold
in intuitionistic logic.
Suppose that P is intuitionistically valid. Then so is (A ⇒ P ) ∨ A. Conse-
quently, the theory presented by (A ⇒ P ) ∨ A is the theory presented by an
Automating Theories in Intuitionistic Logic 9
empty set of axioms. Consider the empty rewrite system. It is therefore com-
patible with (A ⇒ P ) ∨A, and the sequent calculus modulo the empty rewrite
system admits cuts. Thus, the theory presented by (A⇒ P )∨A has an analytic
compatible rewrite system.
Conversely, suppose that the theory presented by (A ⇒ P ) ∨ A has an an-
alytic compatible rewrite system R. By compatibility, ⊢R (A ⇒ P ) ∨ A. By
Proposition 3, either ⊢R A ⇒ P or ⊢R A. In the latter case, that would mean
by compatibility that (A ⇒ P ) ∨ A ⊢ A, but this does not hold as mentioned
above. Hence ⊢R A⇒ P and by compatibility (A⇒ P ) ∨A ⊢ A⇒ P . Because
∨− is invertible, A ⊢ A ⇒ P . Because −⇒ is invertible when there is only one
formula on the right hand side, A ⊢ P . Because A is atomic and does not appear
in P , it cannot be used in this proof, so that ⊢ P . By soundness of LBi, P is
valid.
We therefore reduced the problem of deciding validity in intuitionistic first-
order logic to the problem of deciding whether a theory has an analytic compat-
ible rewrite system. The set of theories having one is therefore not co-recursively
enumerable. ⊓⊔
4 A Procedure to Produce Compatible Rewrite Systems
In this section, we try to find a way to transform the presentation of a theory into
a compatible rewrite system, whishing this rewrite system to be analytic. Because
of Theorem 4, it is not possible to find a terminating algorithm producing such
a rewrite system in all cases where it is possible to find one. The procedure that
we propose does not contradict this because it may not terminate. However, we
try to avoid cases where it would unnecessarily fail.
To ease the description, we present the procedure by a set of transition rules
as is traditional for completion procedures, e.g. in [3]. The procedure is therefore
non-deterministic and may not terminate, in particular when the theory does
not have a compatible rewrite system. Transition rules, which are given below in
Procedure 1, transform a set of sequents S and a set of polarized rewrite rules R.
Given a presentation Θ, the input to the procedure is {− P : P ∈ Θ} for the set
of sequents, and the empty rewrite system. Let us describe the transition rules.
Orient+ and Orient− transform a sequent containing an atomic formula into
rewrite rules. These are the base cases. Note that in Orient+ the right hand
side only contains one formula. Sequents with several formulæ on the right and
no atomic formula on the left are therefore the potential failure cases. To obtain
sequents in which there are atomic formulæ, one may apply the inference rules
of LBi. This is what Decompose does, with the proviso that the inference rules
are invertible to remain in the same theory. Contrary to classical logic, there
remains sequents that cannot be transformed into rewrite rules even though
there exists a compatible rewrite system. Discard and Delete permit to deal
with these sequents. Delete is not really necessary, but it permits to eliminate
redundancies in the construction of the rewrite system. In particular, it gets rid
of tautologies such as those used in the proof of Theorem 4. The rewrite systems
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Procedure 1 Transition rules to compute a compatible rewrite system
Orient+ S ∪ {Γ − A},R  S,R ∪ {A→+ ∃x1, . . . , xn.
V
Γ}
if A atomic and {x1, . . . , xn} = FV (Γ ) \ FV (A)
Orient− S ∪ {Γ, A − ∆},R  S,R ∪ {A→− ∀x1, . . . , xn.
V
Γ ⇒
W
∆}
if A atomic and {x1, . . . , xn} = FV (Γ, ∆) \ FV (A)
Decompose S ∪ {Γ − ∆},R  S ∪
S
1≤i≤n
{Γi − ∆i},R
if
Γ1 − ∆1 · · · Γn − ∆n
r
Γ − ∆
is invertible
Discard S ∪ {Γ − P, ∆},R  S ∪ {Γ − ∆},R if Γ, P ⊢SR ∆
Delete S ∪ {Γ − ∆},R  S,R if Γ ⊢SR ∆ without Cut
Deduce S,R  S ∪ {Γ − ∆},R if Γ − ∆ ∈ CP (R)
produced by all these rules may nevertheless not admit cuts, as shown by the
example A ⇔ A ⇒ B which can lead to the rewrite rules A →+ A ⇒ B and
A →− A ⇒ B (see the introduction). Deduce completes the theory to recover
the cut admissibility. The set CP (R) is the set of conclusions of critical proofs
of R. A critical proof of R is a proof of the form
π
Γ, P − ∆
π′
Γ − Q, ∆
Cut
Γ − ∆
where
– P, Q is a critical pair ofR, i.e. there exists A atomic such that P ←−
R
A−→
R
Q;
– π and π′ are cut-free;
– P (resp. Q) is the principal formula of the last inference rule of π (resp. π′);
– all formulæ in Γ, ∆ are principal in one of the inference rules of π or π′;
– there is no cut-free proof of Γ − ∆ modulo R.
Example 5. Given the axiom A ∨ (B ⇒ A), we apply Decompose to get
− A, B ⇒ A. Because A ⊢ B ⇒ A, we can apply Discard to change− A, B ⇒ A
into − B ⇒ A. We apply Decompose to get B − A. We have the choice be-
tween Orient+ and Orient− to get either the rewrite rule B →− A or the rule
A →+ B, both of them which are analytical rewrite systems compatible with
A ∨ (B ⇒ A).
Example 6. Consider the axioms A ⇒ B ⇒ ⊥ and (A ⇒ B ⇒ ⊥) ⇒ A. If we
apply Decompose and Orient− on the former, we obtain the rule 1: A →−
B ⇒ ⊥. On the latter, we can apply Decompose and Orient+ to get the
rule 2: A
+
−→A ⇒ B ⇒ ⊥. There is a critical proof with the two rules we have
obtained (numbers indicate which rewrite rules are used modulo):
Ax.
B ⇒ ⊥, B − B
⊥−
⊥, B −
⇒−
B ⇒ ⊥, B −
Ax. 1
B, A − B ⇒ ⊥
−⇒
B − A⇒ B ⇒ ⊥
Cut 1,2
B −
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Using Deduce, we therefore add B − to S. It can be oriented into 3: B
−
−→⊥.
The resulting rewrite system, consisting of the rules 1 to 3, is compatible with
the input axioms and is analytical.
We first prove that the procedure produces compatible rewrite systems:
Proposition 7. If S,R S′,R′ then for all sequents Γ − ∆, we have Γ ⊢SR ∆
iff Γ ⊢S
′
R′ ∆.
Moreover, if the derivation of Γ ⊢SR ∆ is Cut-free, so is the derivation of
Γ ⊢S
′
R′ ∆.
Proof. We prove it by cases on the transition rules. For Orient+, for the “only
if” direction, it is enough to show that Γ − A can be proved without Cut in
A →+ ∃x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ , which is easy. For the “if” direction, we proceed by
induction on the lexicographic order of the number of rewrite steps using the
rule A→+ ∃x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ and the structure of the proof. Except for Cut, the
application of an inference rule in LBi modulo R can be decomposed into an
application of r without modulo followed by an explicit conversion rule (two for
Ax.) of the form
Γ, Q − ∆
↑∗ − P
∗
−→
R −
Q
Γ, P − ∆
or
Γ − Q, ∆
−↑∗ P
∗
−→
R +
Q
Γ − P, ∆
.
For Cut, we need two explicit conversions above the application of Cut without
modulo. Consider the last application of an inference rule in a derivation of
Γ ′ − ∆′ modulo R ∪ {A →+ ∃x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ}, and decompose it as shown
above. If the explicit conversion step does not use A →+ ∃x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ ,
then we proceed by structural induction on the proof. Otherwise, suppose that
Γ ′ = P, Σ where P is negatively rewritten by A →+ ∃x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ into Q.
By the induction hypothesis, we obtain a derivation of Q, Σ − ∆ in R. From
Γ − A we can derive ∃x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ − A, and using Lemma 15, we know how
to build a derivation of P − Q. Using a Cut, we therefore have a derivation of
P, Σ − ∆, as expected. The case where the rewriting occurs in ∆ is dual.
The case of Orient− is dual.
For Decompose, this results from the fact that r is supposed invertible.
For Discard, for the “only if” part is obtained by weakening. For the “if”
direction, we replace the premise Γ − ∆ by a Cut between the premise Γ − P, ∆
and the derivation of Γ, P ⊢SR ∆.
For Delete, the “if” part is trivial. For the “only if” direction, replace the
premises Γ − ∆ by the cut-free derivation Γ ⊢SR ∆.
For Deduce, the “only if” part is trivial. For the “if” direction, because
Γ − ∆ ∈ CP (R), it is the conclusion of a proof modulo R. We can therefore
replace the premises Γ − ∆ by this proof.
Remark that for the “only if” direction, we never added Cuts. ⊓⊔
Corollary 8. Given a presentation Θ, if {− P : P ∈ Θ}, ∅  ∗ ∅,R, then Θ
and R are compatible.
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Proof. A proof Θ ⊢ Q can be seen as a derivation ⊢{−P :P∈Θ} Q by replacing
Ax.
Θ − P where P ∈ Θ by the premise − P . ⊓⊔
As usual in completion procedures, we need a fairness condition to ensure that
all critical proofs are dealt with. This condition is the following: at any moment,
if Γ − ∆ ∈ CP (R) \ S then Deduce will eventually add Γ − ∆ in the set of
sequents.
Proposition 9. Under this fairness condition, if the procedure terminates and
produces ∅,R, then R is analytic.
Proof. Suppose that R is not analytic. There exists a sequent that can be proved
with Cut but not without. Consider proofs as trees of couple of inference rules and
principal formula, and define the recursive path ordering defined by the following
precedence: (Cut, P ) > (Ax., Q) > (r, R) for all inference rules r different from Cut
and Ax., and all formulæ P, Q, R; and (Cut, P ) > (Cut, Q) and (Ax., P ) > (Ax., Q)
if Q is a subformula of P . As the precedence is well-founded, so is this ordering.
By induction on this ordering, and following the cut-elimination procedure as
described in [16], we can find a proof of the form
π
Γ, P − ∆
π′
Γ − Q, ∆
Cut
Γ − ∆
where
– P, Q is a critical pair ofR, i.e. there exists A atomic such that P ←−
R
A−→
R
Q;
– π and π′ are cut-free;
– P (resp. Q) is the principal formula of the last inference rule of π (resp. π′);
– there is no cut-free proof of Γ − ∆ modulo R.
In this proof, we can prune all formulæ that are not principal in one of the
inference rules of π or π′, and we therefore obtain a critical proof. By the fairness
assumption, the sequent Γ − ∆ has been added to S during the procedure. By
Proposition 7, the Cut-free derivation Γ − ∆ using the premise Γ − ∆ has been
transformed by the procedure into a Cut-free derivation using premises in ∅ and
rewrite rules in R. We therefore have a Cut-free proof of Γ − ∆ modulo R,
hence the contradiction. ⊓⊔
Note that Procedure 1 is not computable, in the sense that Discard, Delete
and Deduce use oracles that are not recursive. Indeed, the sets ⊢SR and CP (R)
are not co-recursively enumerable in general. Nonetheless, we believe that it is
not possible to do better, because we conjecture the set described in Theorem 4
to be Σ03 -complete in the arithmetical hierarchy (see [4, Chapter C.1] for an
introduction on the arithmetical hierarchy), that is, it is not even recursively
enumerable. Once this conjecture has been proved, we could try to prove that
our procedure with oracles is complete, that is, for all presentations that can be
transformed into an analytic rewrite system, the procedure terminates without
failure. Of course, in the case where the procedure fails, we can keep the remain-
ing sequents in S and use them either as premises, or, if we only want to work
with proofs and not derivations, we can transform these sequents Γ − ∆ into
axioms ∀x1, . . . , xn.
∧
Γ ⇒
∨
∆ with {x1, . . . , xn} = FV (Γ, ∆).
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5 Extensions
In this section, we present some extensions to the procedure presented in the
previous section. For lack of space, we only briefly discuss them.
Axiom Schemata. Theories are often presented not only by axioms but also by
axiom schemata. An axiom schema is a formula in which proposition variables
can appear. The instance of an axiom schema are the formulæ where these
proposition variables are substituted by formulæ. For instance, the induction
principle in Peano’s arithmetic ∀x. (X(0) ∧ ∀y. X(y) ⇒ X(s(y))) ⇒ X(x) is
an axiom schema with the proposition variable X(x). An instance of this axiom
schema is ∀x. (0 + 0 = 0 ∧ ∀y. y + 0 = y ⇒ s(y) + 0 = s(y))⇒ x + 0 = x where
X(x) being substituted by x + 0 = x.
Axiom schemata can be seen as the infinite set of their instances, so that
our procedure works on such presentations. However, in that case, R may be
infinite. The rewrite relation would therefore not be implementable as it is. If
the theory is presented by a finite set of axiom schemata, we can use the work of
Kirchner [18] who shows how to get a finitely presented conservative extension
of the theory. We can then apply Procedure 1 to this finite presentation and
obtain a finite rewrite system if it terminates.
Equalities. First-order theories often use equality, for instance in Peano’s arith-
metic we have the axiom ∀x. 0 + x = x. Such axioms are better represented by
term rewrite rules instead of proposition rewrite rules. In this example, 0+x→ x
is better than 0 + x = x → ⊤. Therefore, given a presentation, before applying
our procedure, a better approach is to take away the equational logic subset of
the presentation (axioms of the form ∀x1, . . . , xn. s = t) and to apply standard
tools to it, for instance Knuth-Bendix completion [20], to obtain a compatible
confluent term rewrite system for that subset. Then, we apply Procedure 1 to
the remaining axioms.
Skolemization. The theory presented by ∃x. A(x) has no analytic compatible
rewrite system, because it does not have the witness property. However, for some
new constant c not appearing in the original signature, A(c) is a presentation
of a conservative extension of this theory that does have an analytic compat-
ible rewrite system, e.g. A(c) →+ ⊤. Nevertheless, contrary to classical logic,
Skolemization does not always lead to a conservative extension in intuitionistic
logic. Mints [22] characterizes the presentations that can be correctly Skolem-
ized. One improvement is therefore to apply Skolemization on those cases before
applying Procedure 1. Nevertheless, even doing so, we will not be able to handle
presentations such as ¬¬∃x. A(x).
Baaz and Iemhoff [2] propose a generalization of Skolemization which works
every time. To sum up the idea, formulæ are translated into their semantic in a
Kripke structure. As the semantic of a Kripke model is defined in classical logic,
the translated formulæ can be Skolemized. For our purpose, we do not even need
to Skolemize these formulæ. Instead, we can apply the completion procedure for
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classical logic described in [7] to the translated presentation. Indeed, Baaz and
Iemhoff proved that a formula is valid in intuitionistic logic iff its translation is
valid in classical logic [2, Lemma 11]. However, we think that this is probably
highly inefficient, in particular because of the transitivity of the accessibility
relation in Kripke structures.
6 Example of Application
We can apply Procedure 1 to one of the axiom sets proposed in the Intuitionistic
Logic Theorem Proving library [24], for instance the presentation of constructive
geometry derived from [25] (files GEJxxx+1.ax). We obtain an analytic compat-
ible rewrite system including among others the three following rules:
x 6=p y →
− ¬x 6∈ ln(x, y) (GEJ002+1.ax, a1)
x 6=p y →
− ¬y 6∈ ln(x, y) (GEJ002+1.ax, a2)
x 6=p y →
− ∀u v. u 6=l v ⇒ (x 6∈ u ∨ x 6∈ v ∨ y 6∈ u ∨ y 6∈ v) (GEJ003+1.ax, a1)
The theorem proposed in the problem GEJ001+1.p therefore has the following
proof in which Γ stands for x 6=p y,¬x 6∈ z,¬y 6∈ z, z 6=l ln(x, y) and the
inference rules that are applied modulo are marked by *:
Ax.
z 6=l ln(x, y) − z 6=l ln(x, y)
Ax.
x 6∈ z − x 6∈ z
¬−
x 6∈ z,¬x 6∈ z − . . .
Ax.
y 6∈ ln(x, y) − y 6∈ ln(x, y)
¬− *
x 6=p y, y 6∈ ln(x, y) −
∨−
x 6∈ z ∨ x 6∈ ln(x, y) ∨ y 6∈ z ∨ y 6∈ ln(x, y), Γ −
⇒−
z 6=l ln(x, y) ⇒ (x 6∈ z ∨ x 6∈ ln(x, y) ∨ y 6∈ z ∨ y 6∈ ln(x, y)), Γ −
∀− *
Γ −
−⇒
x 6=p y,¬x 6∈ z,¬y 6∈ z − ¬z 6=l ln(x, y)
∧−
x 6=p y ∧ ¬x 6∈ z ∧ ¬y 6∈ z − ¬z 6=l ln(x, y)
−⇒
− (x 6=p y ∧ ¬x 6∈ z ∧ ¬y 6∈ z) ⇒ ¬z 6=l ln(x, y)
−∀
− ∀x y z. (x 6=p y ∧ ¬x 6∈ z ∧ ¬y 6∈ z) ⇒ ¬z 6=l ln(x, y)
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a method to find automated theorem proving procedures
adapted to proof search in a particular intuitionistic theory. The idea is to trans-
form a presentation of the theory into a rewrite system, and to combine the
inference rules of a sequent calculus with rewriting. We first proved that it is not
decidable to transform the presentation of a theory into a rewrite system with
an analytic sequent calculus modulo. We nonetheless proposed a (possibly non-
terminating) procedure to do so, covering a large class of presentations. We then
extended the domain of applicability of this procedure by working in conserva-
tive extensions of the theories we want to automate, to get finite presentations,
to better handle equality and to partially authorize Skolemization. This work
opens new challenges that we are now considering.
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First, we would like to know the precise hardness in the arithmetical hierar-
chy of the transformation of a presentation into a compatible analytic rewrite
system , and to prove that Procedure 1 is complete, or to find a complete pro-
cedure, in order to be able to transform all presentations that can be. Besides,
the procedure only guarantees the Cut admissibility, and not the strong nor-
malization. It would be interesting to refine the procedure to also have it, for
instance because strong normalization helps at conceiving proof checkers. Note
that if we are only interested in automated proof search, the normalization is less
crucial, because the admissibility of cuts suffices to ensure the completeness of
the proof-search procedures. Also, remark that the rewrite system produced by
Procedure 1 may be not confluent. The original version of the sequent calculus
modulo may therefore not be equivalent to the polarized version. Nonetheless,
this is not problematic because we are mainly interested in the automated prov-
ing procedures based on deduction modulo, which are equivalent to the cut-free
portion of the polarized version. Another interesting point is the combination of
theories. Given two theories whose presentations have been transformed into an-
alytic compatible rewrite systems, in which cases would the union of the rewrite
system still be analytic? Investigating this question implies the study of modu-
larity in deduction modulo.
We also need to implement Procedure 1. To control its non-termination, we
can resort to iterative deepening, that is, incrementally limiting the number of
times that ⇒−, ∀− and −∃ can be applied. We should link this implementation
with a theorem prover based on deduction modulo that will serve as an oracle
to compute ⊢SR and CP (R).
Finally, we have researched how theories can be presented in deduction mod-
ulo. We could also examine how deductive systems can be encoded in it, in order
to use deduction modulo as a logical framework. It was already proven that de-
duction modulo can encode HOL [10] and every functional pure type system [6].
An interesting issue is to automate how to find out such encodings.
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A Properties of LBi
We introduce the notion of proof skeleton. Indeed, we need to prove some lem-
mata by induction on the proof structure, but without caring about formulæ
that can be pruned.
Definition 10. The proof skeleton associated with a proof is the tree whose
nodes are the inference rules of the proof. Proof skeletons are ordered by the
subtree relation, which is well-founded.
We first prove that LBi admits the structural rules:
Lemma 11. If Γ ⊢ ∆ then Γ, P ⊢ ∆ and Γ ⊢ P, ∆ with the same proof skeleton.
Proof. By induction on the proof structure. ⊓⊔
Proposition 12. All inference rules of LBi but −⇒ and −∀ are invertible, and
the proofs of their premises is smaller or equal for the proof skeleton ordering.
Nonetheless, when there is no extra formula on the right hand side of their
conclusion, −⇒ and −∀ are also invertible, with the same property about the
proof skeleton ordering.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the proof skeleton ordering. We only detail
the most relevant cases.
For all rules r but ∀−, −∃, ⇒−, −⇒ and −∀, either the last inference rule in the
proof of the conclusion of r is r, in which case this is trivial, or we can proceed
by induction. For instance, if we have a proof finishing by
Γ, P, R ∧ S − ∆ Γ, Q, R ∧ S − ∆
∨−
Γ, P ∨Q, R ∧ S − ∆
then by induction hypothesis we have proofs of Γ, P, R, S − ∆ and Γ, Q, R, S − ∆
and therefore we can build a proof of Γ, P ∨Q, R, S − ∆.
For ∀−, −∃, the premises of the inference rule can be obtained by weakening
the proof of its conclusion.
For ⇒−, for the left premise we use weakening, for the right we use induction
with permutations as above.
For −⇒ and −∀ when there is no extra formula on the right hand side of their
conclusion, either the formula on the right hand side is principal somewhere in
the proof of the conclusion, in which case we can permute rules to put it at the
end of the proof, or it is nowhere principal, so that we can prune it and add the
side formulæ by weakening to get the premise. ⊓⊔
Lemma 13. If Γ, P, P ⊢ ∆ then Γ, P ⊢ ∆ with a smaller or equal proof skeleton.
and if Γ ⊢ P, P, ∆ then Γ ⊢ P, ∆ with a smaller or equal proof skeleton.
Proof. By induction on the proof skeleton ordering. For all cases but when P is
Q⇒ S or ∀x. Q on the right hand side, we can use the invertibility of the rule to
decompose P twice, apply the induction hypothesis on the resulting proofs and
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then apply the inference rule to recompose P . For instance, if we have Γ, P ∨
Q, P ∨Q ⊢ ∆, we use the invertibility of ∨− twice to obtain Γ, P, Q, P, Q ⊢ ∆. We
apply the induction hypothesis twice to get Γ, P, Q,⊢ ∆ (note the importance
to state that the contracted proof is smaller or equal for the proof skeleton
ordering). We apply ∨− to get Γ, P ∨Q ⊢ ∆.
If P is Q ⇒ S or ∀x. Q, we reason by case: Either the principal formula of
the last inference rule in Γ ⊢ P, P, ∆ is P , in which case the other P and ∆
are discarded in the proof above. We can therefore discard the other P in the
conclusion. For instance if we have
Γ, R − S
−⇒
Γ − R⇒ S, R⇒ S, ∆
we can build
Γ, R − S
−⇒
Γ − R⇒ S, ∆
Or we can use the induction hypothesis on the subproofs and apply the last
inference rule to get Γ ⊢ P, ∆. For instance, if we have
Γ, P − R⇒ S, R⇒ S, ∆ Γ, Q − R⇒ S, R⇒ S, ∆
∨−
Γ, P ∨Q − R⇒ S, R⇒ S, ∆
then by induction hypothesis we have Γ, P ⊢ R ⇒ S, ∆ and Γ, Q ⊢ R ⇒ S, ∆
and we can apply ∨− to get Γ, P ∨Q ⊢ R⇒ S, ∆. ⊓⊔
Proposition 14. LBi and LB are equivalent.
Proof. We first consider how LB rules are admissible in LBi:
– The lemmata above shows that structural rules are admissible in LBi.
– ⇒−(LB) is admissible by using weakening and applying ⇒−(LBi). This is
the same for ∀−, −∃, ⊥− and −⊤.
– −⇒(LB) is a particular case of −⇒(LBi) where ∆ = ∅. This is the same for
−∀.
– ∧−, −∧, ∨−, −∨ and ∃− are the same in LB and LBi.
Conversely, we consider how LBi rules are admissible in LB:
– ⇒−(LBi) is admissible by using weakening on the right, applying ⇒−(LB)
and applying ∵−. This is the same for ∀− and −∃.
– −⇒(LBi) is obtained by applying −⇒(LB) and applying weakenings. This is
the same for −∀, ⊥− and −⊤.
– −⊥ and ⊤− are particular instances of .− and −..
⊓⊔
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B Properties of polarized LBi
Lemma 15.
If P −→
+
Q using the rule A→+ R, then we can derive Q − P from R − A.
If P −→
+
Q using the rule A→− R, then we can derive Q− P from A − R.
If P −→
−
Q using the rule A→+ R, then we can derive P − Q from R − A.
If P −→
−
Q using the rule A→− R, then we can derive P − Q from A − R.
Proof. By mutual induction on the position where the rewriting occurs. ⊓⊔
We now prove the equivalence between polarized and asymmetric sequent
calculi modulo: Given a non-polarized rewrite system R, it is trivial to find a
polarized rewrite system R± such that the asymmetric LBi modulo R is equiv-
alent to the polarized LBi modulo R±: simply consider two rules A →+ P and
A→− P for each rule A→ P in R.
Conversely, given a polarized rewrite systemR, we can define a non-polarized
rewrite system R∓:
– A→+ P becomes A→ A ∨ P ;
– A→− P becomes A→ A ∧ P .
Proposition 16. Γ − ∆ can be proved in the polarized LBi modulo R iff it can
be proved in the asymmetric LBi modulo R∓.
Proof. A formal proof would require an induction on the structure of the proof.
The proof for classical logic, as can be found in [7], can easily be adapted for
LBi. To give the idea, suppose that a rule A →+ P is used somewhere in the
proof. If P is the principal formula elsewhere in the proof, it is necessarily on
the right of the sequent because of the polarity conditions. If we rewrite A into
A ∨ P instead, we can first apply −∨ in the place where P is principal. This is
dual for the negative rule.
Conversely, suppose that A→ A∨P is used somewhere in the proof. If A∨P
is principal on the right of a sequent, it means that the rewriting occurred at
a positive position. We can instead use weakening and the rewrite by A →+ P
in the position where A ∨ P is principal. If A ∨ P is principal on the left of a
sequent, we get a proof where A appears on the left, so that its rewriting into
A ∨ P was not necessary. ⊓⊔
Finally, let us remark that polarized LJ, polarized LB and polarized LBi are
equivalent. Indeed, working in a polarized sequent calculus modulo R can be
seen as working in the same sequent calculus without modulo but with explicit
conversion rules:
Γ, Q − ∆
↑∗ − P
∗
−→
R −
Q
Γ, P − ∆
and
Γ − Q, ∆
−↑∗ P
∗
−→
R +
Q
Γ − P, ∆
.
As LJ, LB and LBi are equivalent, adding these conversion rules does not break
this equivalence. (One has to be careful with LJ, because the right conversion
rule is not exactly the same because the right hand side of the sequent contains
at most one formula, but it works.)
